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decrease the size of the patronage pool, leading to an increase in the price of 
patronage. Of course, Congress was not monolithic, and the benefits of improv- 
ing productivity relative to the negative effects of a price increase for patronage 
will vary across members. For example, in districts where the productivity of 
the federal  labor force, Q is relatively  more important to voters, it is more 
likely that the first term in equation (A21) will dominate the second. The evi- 
dence presented in the text indicates that the share of federal output tended to 
be the highest in the areas where commercial activity was greatest. The quality 
of federal services, such as postal and customs, was particularly important to 
voters in those districts. Thus, the importance of Q in the informed-voters prob- 
ability function would likely  increase with increases in the share of  federal 
output in the congressional district. 
The above model was also employed in chapter 3 to show why, once having 
adopted a merit system, the proportion of merit system employees to total em- 
ployment would expand with increases in total federal employment, why the 
president would take the lead in expanding merit system coverage, and why 
there would be continuing conflict between the president  and the Congress 
over patronage issues. 
Appendix B 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
In the text, it is argued that, once having adopted a merit system, the proportion 
of merit system employees to total employment would expand with increases 
in total federal employment. In particular, it is argued that the president would 
be in the vanguard to expand coverage. To show why, recall that, in passing the 
Pendleton  Act, Congress gave the president the authority to expand coverage 
of the merit system. In effect, the president was given the power to control r; 
the ratio of merit system workers to total federal civilian employment. Using 
the same assumptions and notation as in appendix A, recall that the president's 
objective function is 
(B1)  O  = C nP(Q, ?)  + C  (N -  n)  H(&W, k). 
Given the power to control r;  the president maximizes support by choosing 2, 
fi,  and K The first-order conditions are 
(B2) 
A* 
V, = H&% -  H, = 0, 
(B3) 
034) 
O+  = Pf(-~~)  + Hd& -  h&~  = 0, 
Or  = kQ~r  + Ff(-~~~)  = 0. 
Equations (B2) and (B3) are the same as before. But now equation (B4) indi- 
cates that the ability to control Y gives the president the option of placing fed- 197  Appendix to Chapter 3 
era1 workers off limits to partisan use, and that can benefit the president in two 
distinct ways. First, increases in r raise productivity. Second, the ability to re- 
duce the number of  patronage positions  means that the president  can effec- 
tively control W  (W  = [  1 -  r]L -  @)  at a lower cost, and that means that he 
will always operate in the elastic proportion of the demand function (i.e., MR 
> 0). 
Now consider the effect of a change in L on K  Once the Pendleton Act was 
passed, the president was in a position to control K  Evaluating the president's 
objective function at P*, W*, and r*, we know from the envelope theorem that 
the following condition must hold: 
From the first-order conditions, equations (B2) and (B4), we obtain 
(B6) 
(B7) 
$'+,  = F,[-(1 -  ~)MRE]  + F,[-(1 -  r)MR2] > 0, 
erL  = kQQrL  + kQQQ,QL  + PI,  [-(1  -  r)LMR2] 
-  kJ[MR + (1 -  ~)LMRE]. 
Given the underlying assumptions, the expression in equation (B6) is unambig- 
uously positive. In equation (B7), the first three terms are positive, while the 
sign of the fourth term depends on the magnitude of MR. If  productivity, Q, 
was not affected by changes in r or was not important in influencing votes, 
tQ  = 0, then the first-order conditions indicate that the president would choose 
W so that MR would be equal to zero. In that case, the fourth term in equation 
(B7) would also be positive, and the sign of ar*/aL would be unambiguously 
positive. When productivity of the federal workforce is important and affected 
by the level of  I;  as we have argued that it is, MR will be positive. But, here 
again, the expression in equation (B7) is positive. Using equation (B4) to re- 
write (B7) yields 
The first three terms in equation (B8) are all positive. The sign of the fourth 
term depends on the underlying functional form of Q.  However, we have ar- 
gued that Q,  < 0 and that Q,  >  0. The rationale is that loss of control over the 
labor force increases with organizational size and, thus, that converting to a 
merit system will have a greater effect on productivity the larger is the size of 
the federal labor force. Given these functional relations, it follows that aQrL/aL 
> 0, indicating that the average function, Q,/L,  lies below the marginal, Q,. 
Accordingly, erL  is positive, implying that an increase in the federal labor force 
will induce the president to expand coverage of the merit system such that r 
will be a positive function of L. This implication was examined in chapter 3. 